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Abstract 
This paper examines the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis (REH) and its sources of 
failure in the case of Bangladesh using various theoretical specifications, annual data 
from 1974-2001 and linear and non-linear time series techniques. The general 
findings tend to invalidate the REH: a finite time horizon and the presence of 
liquidity-constrained individuals are the sources of deviation from the REH. 
Empirical results reveal that real per capita private consumption (C) under various 
specifications is cointegrated generally at the 5% level with real per capita income 
(Y), government expenditure before and after interest rate repayments (G & G2), 
taxes (T) and the interest rate (r). Results reveal that an increase in G, G2, T and r 
reduces C and that that an increase in budget deficits raises trade deficits. These 
results highlight the importance of fiscal policies in boosting private consumption and 
controlling trade deficits, which are the prime goals of stabilisation policies being 
followed by Bangladesh. 
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1. Introduction 
The main aim of this paper is to examine the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis (REH) 
(explained below) and its sources of failure in Bangladesh, using various theoretical 
specifications, annual data from 1974-2001 and time series techniques. Bangladesh is 
a less developed country (LDC), which is associated with a low level of saving, 
investment, per capita income and with a high rate of both fiscal and trade deficits
1
 
(Siddiki (2000, 2002), where both types of deficits generally move together (figure 1 
in the appendix). The sustainability and the consequences of such high deficits are a 
major concern for policy makers of developed and developing countries. Very few 
studies (reviewed below) investigate the consequences of fiscal deficits on private 
consumption and trade deficits in LDCs. As far as the present author is concerned, no 
such study on Bangladesh has been carried out. This type of analyses is particularly 
important for Bangladesh since it has been following stabilisation and structural 
adjustment policies
2
, the success of which mainly depends on the nature of the 
relationships between fiscal policies and private consumption and trade deficits. One 
of the novelty of this paper is to investigate the sources of failure of the REH in a 
developing country such as Bangladesh, which is still an under researched area. Thus, 
the findings of this paper would be important for policy makers in Bangladesh and 
other LDCs.  
Economic theory and empirical evidence are also not decisive for drawing a 
general conclusion on the consequences of fiscal deficits on private consumption and 
the balance of payments despite the central focus of macroeconomic analyses 
                                               
1 The average of fiscal deficits during our sample periods is about 6% of GDP, ranging from 3-9% of 
GDP and the average of trade deficits is more than 7% of GDP, ranging from 3.54 - 12.51% of GDP. 
2 These policies are prescribed by international institutions such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, and are based on demand management policies which suggest reducing 
the budget deficits in order to reduce trade deficits and to increase private investment, thereby 
increasing in income and consumption. 
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concerning the effect of fiscal deficits on macroeconomic variables. In addition, most 
of empirical studies (reviewed below) examining the effects of fiscal deficits on 
private consumption and on trade deficits are mainly concentrated on developed 
countries with some few exceptions
3
. 
 There are mainly two types of views on the consequences of fiscal deficits on 
other macroeconomic variables. The Keynesian model predicts that a rise in fiscal 
deficits increases aggregate demand which in turn stimulates short-run output and 
employment, raises interest rates and also causes a crowding out in private 
investment. The Keynesian proposition asserts that the increase in aggregate demand 
caused by fiscal deficits also widens (reduces) current account or trade deficits 
(surpluses), implying that taxes should be raised in order to reduce budget deficits and 
therefore trade deficits
4
. 
The REH, in contrast with the Keynesian proposition, states that it is 
government purchases and marginal taxes rather than the ratio of debt to taxes that 
have an impact on private consumption and on trade deficits. That is, the mode of 
financing fiscal deficits, i.e. whether fiscal deficits are financed by debt or by tax 
increases, is inconsequential in its effects upon private consumption and therefore 
trade balances, since economic agents consider present period’s deficit financing as a 
future period’s tax liability (Barro (1974, 1989)). The stability of saving and 
                                               
3 For example, Ghatak and Ghatak (1996); Gupta (1992); Haque (1988); Khalid (1996).   
4
 The relationship, according to the twin deficits hypothesis, between government budget deficits and 
trade deficits can be summarised as follows (see Khalid and Guan (1999) for a good review). Firstly, in 
a Mundell-Flemming framework, an increase in government deficits are thought to exert an upward 
pressure on real interest rates, which boosts capital inflows and hence causes an appreciation in real 
exchange rates and a reduction in competitiveness, causing trade (or current account) deficits 
(Rosenweig and Tallman (1993), p. 580; Khalid and Guan (1999), 390). This mechanism is effective 
under both fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes. Under a fixed exchange rate regime, trade deficits 
deteriorate due to a positive income effect caused by the government’s excess expenditures and due to 
an appreciation in real exchange rates. Secondly, the Keynesian absorption theory predicts that a rise in 
budget deficits increases domestic absorption and hence an expansion in imports causing current 
account deficits (see from Khalid and Guan (1999), 390)).  A strong correlation between saving and 
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investment is crucial in supporting the REH as instability in both factors may cause 
both deficits not to be correlated. Thus, according to the REH, fiscal policies do not 
affect the equilibrium level of trade balances, current account, interest rates, money 
demand, private consumption, investment and saving (Vamvoukas (1999))
5
. The REH 
is, however, based on some strong assumptions: (a) capital markets are perfect and the 
consumer does not face any borrowing constraints; (b) both the private and public 
sectors have the same planning horizons; (c) taxes are non-distortionary (Barro (1974, 
1989)).  
Two types of empirical investigation to examine the REH have been carried 
out. One is the estimation of structural private consumption models to examine the 
impact of government expenditures on private consumption (Becker (1997); Ghatak 
and Ghatak (1996); Khalid (1996)). Empirical evidence on this issue is inconclusive 
(see Leiderman and Blejer (1988) and Seater (1993) for a survey). Authors opposed to 
the REH argue that the failures of the proposition are mainly caused by the violation 
of its underlying assumptions. That is, the REH fails mainly due to finite time 
horizons, non-altruistic or inoperative bequest motives, childless couples, liquidity 
constraints and uncertainty (see Seater (1993)).  
The other type of empirical investigation explores the consequences of budget 
deficits on trade deficits; some support the assertion that a budget deficit causes a 
trade deficit while many oppose it (Vamvoukas (1999); Normandin (1999) and 
references are therein). It is also argued that a simple violation of the REH does not 
necessarily imply that the Granger causality runs from budget deficits to trade deficits 
or to private consumption (Normandin (1999)). The legitimacy of strict stabilisation 
                                                                                                                                      
investment (Feldstein and Horioka (1980)) also causes budget deficits and the current accounts of the 
balance of payments to move together, supporting the twin deficits hypothesis.  
5
 Note, however, that LDCs in general, and Bangladesh in particular, are characterised by imperfect 
capital markets (Siddiki (2001, 2002); Auerbach and Siddiki (2002); Ghatak (1995)). 
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policies is criticised when the magnitude of the Granger causality is negligible even  
when the REH is not violated
6
. 
This paper is organised as follows: section two explains the variables used in 
our analysis and sources of data. Section three surveys various specifications of the 
consumption functions which are used to test the REH and to find the sources of 
departures, if any, from the REH. This section also explains the link between budget 
and trade deficits. In section four, models are estimated and empirical results are 
explained. Section five draws conclusions. 
 
2. Variables and Sources of Data
 
 
In this section, we explain the variables, and their data sources, which are used in 
specifying the REH (section three) and empirical modelling (section four). C is 
private consumption, Y is gross domestic product (GDP), T is taxes, d is budget 
deficits, TD is trade deficits, G (G2) is government expenditures excluding 
(including) interest payments on government debt, GI is government investment 
expenditures, RB interest payments on government debt; W is wealth and A is assets: 
both W and A are defined as the sum of total broad money supply and deposits in 
various government sponsored saving schemes; r is real interest rates, bank rates 
minus the rate of inflation measured from the consumer price index. All variables but 
r are expressed in real per capita natural logarithm terms (the GDP deflator with base 
1990 is used). 
Data sources: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (various years) Statistical 
Yearbook of Bangladesh, Government of Bangladesh (various issues) Bangladesh 
Economic Review, Bangladesh Bank (various issues) Economic Trends. 
                                               
6
  The violation or failure of the REH imply that a government can affect trade deficits or private 
consumption by changing the timing of taxes. 
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3.1 Various Specifications of the REH and Crowding-out Hypothesis 
There are mainly two types of consumption functions used in the literature to test the 
REH. One is based on ad hoc, i.e. the Buiter and Tobin (1979), consumption 
functions. The second type of consumption functions incorporates the rational 
expectations hypothesis which assumes the availability of perfect information about 
future government fiscal policies. That is, economic agents can predict future 
government fiscal policies. This type of consumption functions is also used to find the 
causes or sources of the failures, if any, of the REH. In addition, analyses on the 
consequences of budget deficits on trade deficits are also used to test the REH. In this 
section, we will review various theoretical specifications, which will be used in the 
next section to test the REH in Bangladesh. 
Various formulations of the Buiter-Tobin type approach for examining the 
REH and crowding-out hypothesis used in the literature are summarised below (see, 
Ghatak and Ghatak (1996) for a survey): 
W taT taGtaY taaCt 43210     (1) 
10),(  adtT tY taCt     (2) 
T tRBtGtd        (3a) 
implies that 
T tG td  2       (3b) 
where the total government fiscal deficit (d) is the sum of primary deficits (G - T) and 
interest payments (RB) on bonds; the expressions (3a) and (3b) state that an increase 
in (G - T) and a resulting augmentation in RB raise d. Various forms of equation (2) 
which incorporate expressions (3a) and (3b) and some other restrictions are used in 
order to test the REH. For example, Buiter and Tobin (1979) estimated the following 
equation: 
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d taT taY taaCt 3210     (4) 
subject to the following restrictions: 
.32 and21,03,02,110 aaaaaaa   (5) 
The REH is confirmed if aaa 3 and 2,1  are statistically significant and the 
restrictions in equation 5 are satisfied. The statistically significant coefficients and 
equation 5 recapitulate the main assertion of the REH: the mode of financing fiscal 
deficits - i.e. whether fiscal deficits are financed by debt or by tax increases - is 
inconsequential on private consumption since economic agents consider present 
period’s deficit financing as future period’s tax liabilities (Barro (1974, 1989)).  
The restriction aa 32   implies that the sign and magnitudes of the 
coefficients for both taxes and government expenditures are the same: both taxes and 
government expenditures exert the same effect on consumption. Rational agents with 
perfect foresight, i.e. in the absence of uncertainty, would be inclined to believe that 
deficits incurred by the government today will be completely offset by rising taxes in 
the next period.  
The coefficient a1  represents marginal propensity to consume and this, in 
accordance with standard theory, is positive and less than one. The restriction 
implying that the coefficients of income and taxes are equal but opposite in sign, i.e., 
aa 21 , indicates that consumption losses due to an imposition of taxes are equal to 
consumption gains resulting from a same amount of increase in income or vice versa. 
The coefficient of (Y-T) simply measures the impact of disposable income on C if the 
restriction aa 21  is validated.   
Incorporating equation (3b), Kormendu (1983) proposes the following 
‘augmented consolidated approach’:  
 9 
2321 G taT taY taCt      (6) 
A statistically insignificant a 2  implies that government deficits have no impact on 
current consumption, lending support to the REH. This follows from the fact that the 
consumption decisions of rational consumers depend on the present value of 
government expenditures rather than on the timing of taxes (Barro (1989)). Using 
expression (3b) and imposing the restriction that the coefficients of taxes and 
government spending are equal, though opposite, in sign Boskin (1988) also provides 
the following: 
dtaG tY taCt 2)2(1      (7) 
a positive and statistically significant value of a 2  invalidates REH. To test REH and 
crowding-out hypothesis, equation (2) can also be rewritten as  
11032210  aRBtaG taY taaCt . (8) 
subject to the restrictions explained in equation (5) and as 
110221  aG taY taCt .   (9a) 
A negative and statistically significant a 2  implies that government consumption 
crowds out private consumption. The crowding out hypothesis asserts that an increase 
in government expenditure or investment results in a reduction in private consumption 
or expenditure. Deficit financing raises real interest rates, which in turn reduces 
private or any other interest-sensitive form of private spending. Thus, we can write:  
03,2,1102321  aaaG tartaY taCt  (9b) 
and   03,2,110321  aaaGItartaY taCt  (9c) 
where GI is government investment. 
Incorporating the rational expectations proposition, Aschaur (1985) derived 
the second type of consumption function, to test the REH, which maximises 
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intertemporal utility subject to a budget constraint (see also Gupta (1992) for a 
review, pp. 20-21). Aschaur assumes that a representative household with a quadratic 
utility function maximises the net present value of consumption in the current and 
future periods. The author uses the following Eüler equation: 
Cb taCtEt
*
1
*
1      (10a) 
where E is expectations operator and C
*
 is the effective private consumption 
described by  
2* G tCtCt     (10b) 
where C is actual private consumption and G2 is government consumption. According 
to equation (10b), government utilities influence private utilities and each unit of G2 
is assumed to yield the same utility as  units of private spending. A positive value of 
 implies that government spending is a substitute for private spending. On the other 
hand, a negative value of  indicates government spending is a complement to private 
spending
7
. Substitution of the lagged of equation (10b) into (10a) gives the following: 
2 11
*
1 Gb tbCtaCtEt      (10c) 
Assume that expectations are formed at time t-1 and taking the expectations of 
equation (10b), then we can write: 
 21
*
121
*
1 G tEtCtEtCtG tEtCtCtEt    (10d) 
Substituting equation (10c) into (10d) and incorporating the rational expectations 
hypothesis, i.e. actual consumption is expected consumption plus a random error ut 
which is purely a random walk, we obtain the following: 
                                               
7
  2*2* G tCtCtG tCtCt  A positive value of  gives a negative coefficient for G2 and thus 
implies that an increase in G2 reduces C, i.e. government spending is a substitute for private spending. On the other hand, a 
negative value of  gives a positive coefficient of G2, implying that an increase in G2 raises C, i.e. government spending is a 
complement to private spending. 
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     utG tEtGb tCb taCt  212 11    (10e) 
Assume that 21G tEt  is given by  
dtLG tLG tEt )(2)(21       (10f) 
where L is lag operator and  and  are two suitable polynomials, the lag operator 
implies:  
  d td tG tG tG tEt 22112 222 1121    (10g) 
Substitution of equation (10g) into (10e) gives: 
utd td t
G tG tG tbCb taCt




2211
2 332 222 1)1(1)(


(10h) 
Considering the limited number of observations and the possibility of 
multicollinearity among lagged variables with a limited number of observations, we 
chose one lag of G2 and d in our empirical analysis in the next section; the rational 
expectations hypothesis also implies that actual government spending is expected 
spending plus a random error t. Thus equation (10f) can be written as follows: 
 td tG tG t  112 112  (10i) 
In the case of one lags for G and d, equation (10h) can be written as:  
utd tG tbCtCt  112 111    (10j) 



11
),1(1
),( with



b
a
 (10k) 
The cross equation restrictions in equation (10k), which are apparent from the 
corresponding coefficients of equations (10h) and (10j), are based on a rational 
expectations hypothesis. The acceptance of these restrictions in empirical analyses 
validates the REH. Following Aschaur (1985), we first estimate (10i) and (10j) under 
restrictions given by (10k) and then the unrestricted version of (10j) to test whether 
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the restrictions are violated or not. The REH is rejected when the restrictions are 
violated. 
There are two main types of difficulties associated with this form of 
intertemporal consumption function. The first is a general one associated rational 
expectations since only past values of dG  and 2 may not enough to estimate 
2 11G tEt  . The second problem is related to the number of lags to be used for 
annual data and this problem become very acute with the short time series and with 
the presence of multicolinearity among lag variables as is the case for Bangladesh. 
 In addition, many authors use a discrete-time version of the Blanchard (1985) 
model to test the REH and to find the sources of departures from the REH (see 
Himarios (1995) for a survey). According to the Blanchard (1985) model, the REH 
breaks down if a fraction () of the population dies in each period and transitory 
consumption or preference shocks are absent: 
 










 

 Y jtlEt
j
j r
j
AtrCt ,
0 1
1
1)1(

     (11a) 
where At 1  is the stock of real assets outstanding at the end of period (t-1), r is 
constant real returns on these assets,  is the constant probability of dying, Yl,t is the 
real disposable labour income and Et is the expectations operator,  is the propensity 
to consume out of total wealth. The first term in the brackets is the non-human wealth 
and the second term is human wealth. This model predicts that the REH fails if  >0, 
implying that a fraction of people die in each period, because a positive value of  ( 
> 0) causes economic agents to use different discount factors for taxes and interest 
payments (see Himarios (1995), p. 166). 
The aggregate budget constraint can be written as follows: 
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CtY tlAtrAt  ,1)1(    (11b) 
Equations (11a, 11b) are used by many authors in deriving the aggregate consumption 
function in the form of observable variables. For example, Evans (1988) solves the 
model and derives the following consumption function in the form of non-human 
wealth by eliminating human wealth from the equation: 



 t
At
r
Ct
r
Ct 





 1
1
1
1)1(
1
1
  (11c) 
On the other hand, Haque (1988) provides the following consumption function by 
eliminating  (after substituting for) non-human wealth: 








1
1
1
1,
1
1
2)1(1
)1( 2
1
1
1
1)1(

















t
r
tY tl
r
Ct
r
CtrCt
  (11d) 
Hayashi (1982) incorporates both human and non-human wealth in the consumption 
function: 
 
 






tY tl
r
At
r
Ct
r
Ct










1,
1
1
21
)1( 2
1)1(1
1
1
 (11e) 
where      Y jtlEtEtr
j
j
t 


 ,11
0
1  . The presence of an infinite 
time horizon, i.e.  = 0, indicates that consumption in all three approaches follows a 
random walk, i.e.  =1, implying that only lagged values of consumption rather than 
any other variables explains current consumption (Hall (1978)). 
Examining the validity or departures, if any, of the REH using equations 11c, 
11d and 11e is based on whether  > 0 or  = 0; and consequently, whether all 
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coefficients other than lagged consumption are zero
8
. The REH breaks down if  > 0. 
The difference in the time horizons of the government and of private economic agents 
has been considered as a potential source of failure of the REH (Haque (1988)). A 
positive value of  generates a positive coefficient of lagged income: a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient of lagged income invalidates the REH. On the other 
hand, a zero vale of  gives a positive coefficient of lagged consumption but a zero 
value for the coefficient of lagged income: current consumption only depends on past 
consumption rather than on any other variable. Thus, differences in the horizons of 
the government and of private economic agents cannot be regarded as a source of 
departure from the REH. 
Results of the linear version of 11c, 11d and 11e encounter the following 
difficulties (Himarios’s (1995)): Firstly, the equations are misspecified because of the 
violation of the perfect capital market assumption. Secondly, (non-linear) restrictions 
implicit in each equation are not taken into account with linear estimation. Himarios’s 
(1994) (reviewed in Himarios’s (1995)) shows that the Blanchard (19885) model 
gives the following three equivalent solutions, corresponding to equations 11c-11e, 
when the assumption of perfect capital markets is relaxed:  
 
  utY t
r
Y tAt
r
Ct
r
Ct


























11
1
1
1
1
1
11
1
1







 (11c’) 
   
     







tY t
r
Y t
r
Y tCt
r
Ct
r
Ct
























2
1
)1( 2
11)1()1(
1
1
2
1
)1( 2
11)1)(1(1
1
1
    (11d’) 
                                               
8
 A zero value of  supports the assumption of infinite horizon that the individual’s subjective probability of survival is unity 
while a positive value of , i.e. a fraction of population () dies each period, indicates a finite horizon or survival rate. 
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 
  utY t
r
Y tAt
r
Ct
r
Ct





















1)(
1
1
2
1
)1( 2
1)1(1
1
1






       (11e’) 
The parameter  represents the fraction of income that goes to liquidity constrained 
households. If  =  = 0, then equations 11c’-11e’ reduce to a random walk 
specification. Thus when equations 11c’-11e’ are estimated as unconstrained linear 
models that ignore liquidity constraints and finite time horizons. If the null hypothesis 
that there is no liquidity constraint (i.e.  = 0) is rejected, it could be argued that the 
presence of liquidity constraints causes the REH to fail. Similarly, if the null 
hypothesis implying the presence of infinite horizon ( = 0) is rejected, it could be 
argued that the presence of a finite horizon causes the violation of the REH.  
Similar to equation 11d above, Haque (1988) explores whether a finite time 
horizon in life span, i.e.  > 0, and resulting differences in discount factors of the 
private and government sectors are causes of departure from the REH. He uses 
following linear model in his estimation: 
  vtT tY tCtCtCt  1122110    (12a) 
A statistically insignificant 2 implies that the individual’s subjective probability of 
survival is unity, supporting the assumption of an infinite time horizon, and so that the 
differences in the horizons between the government and private economic agents 
cannot be regarded as a source of the departure from the REH (Haque (1988), p. 328). 
Khalid (1996) also uses the following reduced form equation to explore the 
sources of departures the REH in  20 LDCs (p. 420): 
utGtGtY tY tCtCt  25142312110  (12b) 
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the coefficient of Ct-1 (1) is statistically significant and close to unity when (current) 
consumption follows a random walk. On the other hand, if the lagged income 
coefficients are statistically significant, then economic agents faced liquidity 
constraints since the consumption of economic agents without liquidity constraints 
should depend upon current income rather than past income.    
 
3.2 The twin deficits and REH 
The Keynesian proposition asserts that the government deficits resulting from excess 
or increased government expenditures reduce current account or trade surpluses, and 
vice versa. One of the policy implications of the Keynesian proposition is the 
desirability of raising taxes in order to reduce budget deficits, which in turn will 
reduce trade deficits. The REH, in contrast with the Keynesian proposition, states that 
a tax increase would contract budget deficits but would not alter trade or current 
account deficits.  
Rearranging the accounting identity relating gross national income on an 
expenditure basis and an income basis, the link between fiscal accounts and the 
external balance can be expressed as (Agenor (1999)): 
   NTXMT)(G)S
PI P(    (13a) 
Where I
P
 is private investment, S
P
 is private saving, G is government spending, T is 
government revenue, M is imports, X is exports and NT is net current transfers from 
abroad. This equation states that as long as (I
P
 - S
P
) remains stable, changes in fiscal 
deficits (G-T) will be closely associated with movements in current account deficits 
(X–M - NT). However, the relationship between fiscal and external deficits may be 
weakened if increases in government expenditures are associated with reductions in 
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private investment (the crowding out effect). This happens when economic agents can 
anticipate that a current increase in public debt is associated with a future tax increase. 
Thus, the following specification can be used to test whether fiscal deficits cause trade 
deficits:  
dααTD 1    (13b) 
TD is trade deficits and d s budget deficits. A statistically insignificant 1 confirms 
the REH while a negative and statistically significant 1 violates the REH. 
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4. Interpretation of the results of the REH and the crowding-out hypotheses for 
Bangladesh, 1974-2001 
Integration and cointegration analyses are used in our empirical investigation (Engle 
and Granger (1987)). The integration analysis shows that data are first difference 
stationary, i.e. the levels are non stationary, while the first differences are stationary 
(table 1 in the appendix). Results from cointegration regression are reported in table 2 
in the appendix.  
The general findings of the extensive empirical exploration in this paper 
confirm that the REH is violated in Bangladesh where the presence of liquidity 
constrained households, i.e. the presence of imperfections in the financial markets and 
finite survival rates are the sources of deviation from the REH. Empirical results show 
that real per capita private consumption (C) under various specifications is 
cointegrated generally at the 5% level with real per capita income (Y), government 
expenditures before and after interest rate repayments (G & G2), taxes (T), interest 
rate (r) and government’s interest repayments (RB) (table 2 in the appendix). The 
results from the corresponding error correction models for various specifications 
support the long-run relationships of private consumption with income, interest rate 
and fiscal variables (table 3 in the appendix).   
The cointegrated or long-run relationship of C with G or G2 and T invalidates 
the REH since this proposition postulates no impact or relationship on private 
consumption of G and T (equations 1, 6 and 9 in table 2 in the appendix).  The results 
reveal that the coefficient of G2 is negative and statistically significant, implying that 
an increase in government expenditures (exclusive of interest rate repayments) 
reduces private consumption. The coefficient of taxes becomes statistically significant 
with a negative sign when government expenditures (G or G2) are excluded from the 
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model. This is plausible since the impact of fiscal policies could be captured by 
government expenditures when both G (or G2) and T are included, causing T to be 
insignificant in the model.   
Results also reveal that the coefficient of budget deficits is negative and 
statistically significant, implying that an increase in budget deficits reduces private 
consumption (equations 4 and 7 in table 2 in the appendix). In addition, the coefficient 
for interest rate is negative and statistically significant (equation 9b in table 2 in the 
appendix). Deficit financing raises real interest rates, which in turn reduce private or 
any other interest sensitive form of private spending. Empirical results on the 
relationship between budget (d) and trade deficits reveal that budget deficits exert a 
positive and statistically significant impact on trade deficits, refuting the REH 
(equation 13b in table 2 in the appendix).  
Thus, our results on the private consumption function estimation, and the 
relationship between trade and budget deficits do not confirm the REH. The REH is 
also rejected due to the violation of restrictions explained in equation 5 on equations 4 
and 8: (i) 11a   and (ii) aaaa 32 and21   (table 2 in the appendix)
9
. 
The violation of 11a  ( 23.11a , in equation 4 without an intercept and 
22.11a  in equation 8 with an intercept) is simply due to the fact that private 
consumption in a developing country such as Bangladesh is influenced by many 
unreported factors. There are many sources of incomes that are not included in the 
national account and thus per capita income is generally underestimated. This result is 
                                               
9
 The restriction 11a implies that marginal propensity to consume is less than one; aa 21  implies that consumption 
losses due to an imposition of taxes are equal to consumption gains resulting from a same amount of increase in income or vice 
versa; aa 32   asserts that deficits incurred by the government today will be completely offset by rising taxes in the next 
period.  
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also consistent with the poor accounting system in Bangladesh in which many 
economic activities are left unreported. 
Our results violate the restriction aa 21 :  23.02 and 23.11  aa in 
equation 4 without an intercept, 0.376- 2 and  22.11  aa  in equation 8 with an 
intercept. The violation of this restriction indicates the differential impact on private 
consumption of income and taxes and thereby invalidates the REH.  
Our results also give 137.03 and  227.02  aa  for equation 4 without an 
intercept and 002.03 and  376.02  aa equation 8 with an intercept (table 2 in 
the appendix). The violation of the restriction aa 32  , i.e. the differential impact of 
taxes and government spending on private consumption, implies that the consumption 
decision of a rational agent will be affected by government fiscal policy. The finding 
of aa 32   indicates that a reduction in consumption caused by a rise in taxes is 
higher than a reduction in consumption due to a rise in government expenditures. This 
differential impact implies that a rising deficit financing financed by issuing bonds 
instead of taxation will tend to raise consumption owing to the wealth effects.   
Similarly, the estimates of coefficients of equation 9 also reject the REH 
because the restriction that the coefficient of Y be equal in absolute value to the 
coefficient of G2 is not satisfied (table 2 in the appendix). The rejection of the REH in 
our analysis in the case of Bangladesh should imply the acceptance of the crowding 
out hypothesis, which is confirmed by the negative and statistically significant 
coefficients of G, G2, T and r in our analysis. 
The results on the rational expectations rule also tends to some extent to 
violate the REH
10
 (table 4 in the appendix). We first consider the estimated values of 
                                               
10
 As explained in the footnote of table 4 below, Eviews gives somewhat unstable and implausible results, which are mainly 
caused by the mis-specification of the model, since only past values of G2 and d may not enough to estimate Et-1G2t-1. In 
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b and . The results on b are contradictory: the value of b is statistically insignificant 
in the unrestricted model while statistically significant in the restricted model. The 
parameter  measures the extent of the ex ante crowding out of private consumption 
expenditures by government expenditures.  = –0.38 and is statistically significant, 
indicating a certain degree of complementarity between government and private 
expenditure. This result contradicts our earlier findings
11
. Having found the violation 
of the REH in the Buiter-Tobin type models and contradictory results in rational 
expectation models, further investigation using linear and non-linear models is carried 
out in order to explore the robustness of the results from Buiter-Tobin type models. 
Empirical results from all three models (equations 11c, 11d & 11d) reveal that 
consumption follows a random walk, i.e.  =1 is rejected (table 5 in the appendix). On 
the other hand, the empirical results support the presence of infinite horizon, i.e.  = 
0, which implies that consumption should follow a random walk, i.e.  =1. These 
conflicting findings, which are thought to be caused by model mis-specification and 
non-linear restrictions, lead us to estimate equations 11c’, 11d’ and 11e’, which 
incorporate financially constrained households (). Empirical findings from the non-
linear estimation of these models reveal that  and  are statistically significant (table 
6 in the appendix). These results imply that the presence of finite horizons (i.e.  > 0) 
and the presence of financial constrained households or imperfections in financial 
markets  (i.e.  > 0) are the sources of the failures of the REH. Both sources of failure 
                                                                                                                                      
addition, selecting the number of lags to be used for annual data is arbitrary and difficult and such problems become very acute 
with the short time series as is the case for Bangladesh.  
11
 As explained above, the finite horizon ( > 0)and the presence of liquidity-constrained individuals are considered as the main 
sources of deviation from the REH. Estimated results from the linear and non-linear version of equations 11c, 11d & 11e are used 
to explore the sources of the departures of the REH (tables 5 and 6 in the appendix). The presence of infinite horizon, i.e.  = 0, 
suggests that consumption in all three approaches follows a random walk: only lagged values of consumption rather than any 
other variables explains current consumption (Hall (1978)). A linear models test the hypothesis that all coefficients other than the 
coefficient of lagged consumption are insignificant, i.e. consumption follows a random walk model, implying that the coefficient 
of lagged consumption is one (Hall (1978)). On the other hand, the non-linear models examine whether  = 0 and   =1.  
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of the REH are consistent with the existing literature on developing countries (Ghatak 
and Ghatak (1996), Khaled (1996), Haque (1988)). 
The results of linear estimation of equations 11c’ and 11d’ reveal that the 
coefficients of lagged income or lagged disposable income in all three models are 
positive and statistically significant (table 6 in the appendix). The positive coefficient 
of past income implies that a group of individuals is faced with liquidity constraints, 
so that their consumption decision is also influenced by past income. Thus, these 
results in 11e’ are consistent with the non-linear estimation results. Similar results are 
derived when the Khaled (1996) model, which includes income and government 
expenditures, is estimated. The results in the Khaled (1996) model reveal that lagged 
government expenditures exert a positive impact on current consumption. This result 
is consistent with the fact that (lagged) government expenditures increase (lagged) 
private income, which in turn raises (current) consumption.  
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5. Conclusions 
This paper examines the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis (REH) and its sources of 
failure in the case of Bangladesh using various types of theoretical specifications, 
annual data from 1974-2001 and linear and non-linear time series techniques. The 
empirical findings tend to invalidate the REH and reveal that a finite time horizon and 
the presence of liquidity-constrained individuals are the sources of deviation from the 
REH. Empirical results show that real per capita private consumption (C), under 
various specifications, is cointegrated generally at the 5% level with real per capita 
income (Y), government expenditures before and after interest rate repayments (G & 
G2), taxes (T), budget deficits (d) and the interest rate (r).  
The results reveal that the coefficients of G2, d and r are is negative and 
statistically significant, implying that an increase in these variables reduces private 
consumption: deficit financing raises the real interest rate which in turn reduces 
private or any other interest sensitive form of private spending. The coefficient for the 
variable taxes becomes statistically significant with a negative sign when government 
expenditures (G or G2) are excluded from the model. This result is plausible, since the 
impact of fiscal policies is captured by government expenditures when both G (or G2) 
and T are included, causing T to be insignificant in the model.   
Empirical findings on the relationship between the budget (d) and trade 
deficits imply that budget deficits exert a positive and statistically significant impact 
on trade deficits, refuting the REH. Thus, our results on private consumption function 
estimation, and on the relationship between trade and budget deficits do not confirm 
the REH.   
The finding of the differential impact of taxes and government expenditures 
violates the REH and indicates that a reduction in consumption caused by a rise in 
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taxes is higher than a reduction in consumption due to a rise in government 
expenditures. This differential impact implies that a rising deficit financed by issuing 
bonds instead of taxation will raise consumption owing to wealth effects.  The 
violation on this restriction indicates the differential impact on private consumption of 
income and taxes and hereby invalidates the REH. 
Results from non-linear estimation methods imply that the presence of finite 
horizons and the presence of financial constrained households or imperfections in the 
financial markets are the sources of the failures of the REH. The results from the 
linear model reveal that the coefficients of lagged income or lagged disposable 
income positively affect current consumption, implying that some individuals are 
faced with liquidity constraints, therefore their current consumption decision is also 
influenced by past income. Thus both linear and non-linear methods provide 
consistent results which confirm the existing literature.  
In short, our extensive empirical exploration confirms that the REH is violated 
in Bangladesh where the presence of liquidity constrained households, i.e. the 
presence of imperfections in the financial markets and finite survival rates are the 
sources of the deviation of the REH. Thus, fiscal policies should be used as important 
policy instruments in order to boost private consumption and control trade deficits, 
which are the prime goals of stabilisation policies being followed in Bangladesh. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table 1: Augmented Dicky-Fuller Test for Unit Roots (check the results again: 
do tests again using updated data 
Variables Levels First Difference Variables Levels First Difference 
B -2.7025 -5.97 T -1.8274 -7.7743 
TD -1.6986 -10.4779 Y 2.7543 -5.6563 
C -0.19880 -5.4599 Y-G2 2.2529 -5.1653 
G -1.2947 -7.1405 Y-T 2.0148 -4.8938 
G2 -1.1432 -6.8550 W -1.6169 -66.2374 
‘r’ -2.5044 -7.6366 RB -2.9009 -4.8115 
      
 
The Schwartz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) is selecting number of lags. In all cases, the number 
of lags based on SBC appears to be sufficient to secure the lack of autocorrelation of error 
terms. Critical value with 22 observations is –2.9750. 
Figure 1 
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Table 2: Results on the REH: Equations 1 and 4: sample period: 1974-2001  
 
Equation no. 
and variables 
(1) 
Estimated 
coefficients 
(2) 
t-values 
 
(3) 
R
2
, DW, ADF and its critical value(CV) and 
other diagnostic tests
12
 
(4) 
1. C = f(INPT, Y, G, T, W); Sample periods: 1974-2001 (28 observations) 
INPT -0.118 -0.12 R
2
 = 0.94; DW = 1.69; ADF =-4.5963 (CV=-
4.9527); AR2-2(2) = 0.883[0.643]; RESET-
F(1, 22) = 0.6578[0.426]; NOR- 2(2) = 
12.1909[0.002]; H-F(1, 26) = 3.18[0.086] 
Y 1.300** 9.12 
G -0.340** -5.21 
T -0.037 -0.68 
W -0.019 -0.45 
1a. C = f(INPT, W, G, T) 
INPT 8.515 19.02 R
2
 = 0.76; DW = 0.99; ADF =-2.7157 (CV=-
4.5276); AR2-2(2) = 7.27[0.026]; RESET-
F(1, 23) = 6.2451[0.020]; NOR- 2(2) = 
2.2609[0.323]; H-F(1, 26) = 0.13439[0.717] 
W 0.276** 4.64 
G -0.402** -2.95 
T 0.132 1.21 
1b. C = f(INPT, W, G, T) with  AR(1)  
INPT 9.00 17.57  
R
2
 = 0.82; DW = 1.996 (the coefficient of 
AR(2) is not significant) 
W 0.290** 3.92 
G -0.482** -3.42 
T 0.127 1.45 
AR(1) 0.576** 3.73 
1. C = f(Y, G, T) without intercept and W 
Y 1.288** 43.22 R
2
 = 0.95; DW = 1.78; ADF =-4.9352 
(CV
13
=-4.17); AR2-2(2) = 0.62589[0.731]; 
RESET-F(1, 24) = 0.16354[0.689]; NOR- 
2(2) = 7.14[0.028]; H-F(1, 26) = 0.08[0.071] 
G -0.346** -5.75 
T -0.054 -1.44 
4. C = f(INPT, Y, T, d) 
INPT -0.32 -0.52 R
2
 = 0.94; DW = 1.78; ADF =-4.9570 (CV= -
4.5276); AR2-2(2) = 0.523[0.770]; RESET-
F(1, 23) = 0.24121 [0.628]; NOR- 2(2) = 
3.522[0.172]; H-F(1, 26) = 2.6964[0.113] 
Y 1.284** 12.63 
T -0.246** -5.51 
d    -0.137** -4.87 
4. C = f(Y, T, d) without intercept
14
 
Y 1.233** 49.28 R
2
 = 0.94; DW = 1.74; ADF =-4.7405 (CV= -
4.17); AR2-2(2) = 0.76572[0.682]; RESET-
F(1, 24) = 0.25744[0.617]; NOR- 2(2) = 
5.2754[0.072]; H-F(1, 26) = 2.1681[0.151] 
T -0.227** -9.54 
D -0.137** -4.92 
                                               
12
 Throughout our analysis, t-statistics are reported in the parentheses, ** and * represent 1% and 5% significance levels, 
respectively.  AR2- 2(2) is chi square tests for second order residual joint autocorrelation; RESET-F is the F test for mis-
specified functional form; NOR- 2(2) is the chi square statistic for testing normality; H-F is the F statistics for testing 
heteroscedasticity; probability values are reported in the square brackets. 
13
 Estimation is carried out using Microfit 4.0, which provides critical values (CVs) of Dickey-Fuller and Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) tests when a constant is included with a model; we use CVs from Charemza and Deadman (1997) (p. 288) if a 
model is estimated without a constant. There is no significant difference between the CVs obtained from both sources. The CVs 
of ADF tests reported in this paper are based on 30 observations. 
14
 Wald Statistic 2( 1) = 2480.6 [.000] for a1=|a2|; Wald Statistic 
2
( 1) = 5.9936[.014] for a2=a3; where for a1, a2 and a3 are the 
coefficients of Y, T and d, respectively. 
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Table 2: continued (equations 6, 7, 8 and 9a) 
 
Eq. No. and 
variables 
(1) 
Estimated 
coefficients 
(2) 
t-values 
 
(3) 
R
2
, DW, ADF and its critical value(CV) and 
other diagnostic tests 
(4) 
6. C = f(INPT, Y, T, G2) 
INPT -0.250 -0.44 R
2
 = 0.95; DW = 1.74; ADF =-4.8158(CV= -
4.5276); AR2-2(2) = 1.3736[0.503]; RESET-
F(1, 23) = 0.002[0.962]; NOR- 2(2) = 
5.1942[0.074]; H-F(1, 26) = 3.6864[.066] 
Y 1.315** 14.06 
T -0.037 -0.69 
G2 -0.356** -5.79 
6. C = f(Y, T, G2) with out intercept 
Y 1.275** 46.46 R
2
 = 0.95; DW = 1.72; ADF =-4.6720(CV= -
4.17); AR2-2(2) = 1.6297[0.443]; RESET-
F(1, 24) = 0.19454[0.663]; NOR- 2(2) = 
7.1521[0.028]; H-F(1, 26) = 3.06[0.092] 
T -0.023 -0.54 
G2 -0.356** -5.87 
7. C = f(INPT, (Y-G2), d) 
INPT 1.936** 3.72 R
2
 = 0.87; DW = 1.26; ADF =-3.6494(CV= -
4.0706); AR2-2(2) =6.2157 [0.045]; RESET-
F(1, 24) = 0.0845[0.774]; NOR- 2(2) = 
5.40[0.067]; H-F(1, 26) = 1.1065[0.303] 
(Y-G2) 0.851** 12.64 
d -0.124** -3.12 
7. C = f(INPT, (Y-G2), d) with AR(1) 
INPT 1.91** 2.66 R
2
 = 0.89; DW = 1.75 
(Y-G2) 0.86** 9.56 
d -0.13** -3.10 
AR(1) 0.35 1.96 
8. C = f(INPT, Y, G2, RB)
15
 
INPT 0.465 1.0422 R
2
 = 0.95; DW = 1.67; ADF =-4.4421(CV= -
4.5276); AR2-2(2) =1.31 [0.519]; RESET-
F(1, 23) = 0.000[0.999]; NOR- 2(2) = 
7.24[0.027]; H-F(1, 26) = 3.04[0.093] 
Y 1.221** 15.60 
G2 -0.376** -7.95 
RB 0.002 0.35 
8. C = f(Y, G2, RB) without intercept 
Y 1.297** 43.38 R
2
 = 0.94; DW = 1.57; ADF =-4.2484(CV= -
4.17); AR2-2(2) =1.4411[.486]; RESET-F(1, 
24) = 1.09[0.308]; NOR- 2(2) = 0.98[0.613]; 
H-F(1, 26) = 3.97[0.035] 
G2 -0.404** -10.32 
RB 0.004 0.82 
9a. C = f(INPT, Y, G2) 
INPT -0.007 -0.02 R
2
 = 0.95; DW = 1.63; ADF =-4.4125(CV= -
4.0706); AR2-2(2) =1.6780 [0.432]; RESET-
F(1, 24) = 0.004[0.951]; NOR- 2(2) = 
3.98[0.136]; H-F(1, 26) = 3.41[0.076] 
Y 1.28** 15.94 
G2 -0.38** -8.29 
9a. C = f(Y, G2) without intercept
16
 
Y 1.28** 52.02 R
2
 = 0.95; DW = 1.63; ADF =-4.4142(CV= --
3.82); AR2-2(2) =1.6832 [0.431]; RESET-
F(1, 25) = 0.003[0.98]; NOR- 2(2) = 
4.07[0.131]; H-F(1, 26) = 3.39[0.077] 
G2 -0.38** -12.27 
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 Wald Statistic 2( 1) = 2.1201[.145] for a1=|a2| ; Wald Statistic 
2
( 1) = 175.3211[.000] for a2=a3; where for a1, a2 and a3 are the 
coefficients of Y, G2 and RB, respectively.  
16
 Wald Statistic 2( 1) = 18077.4[.000] for a1=|a2|. 
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Table 2: continued (equations 9b and 13b) 
 
 
Eq. No. and 
variables 
(1) 
Estimated 
coefficients 
(2) 
t-values 
 
(3) 
R
2
, DW, ADF and its critical value(CV) and 
other diagnostic tests 
(4) 
9b. C = f(INPT, Y, G2, r) 
INPT 0.457 1.09 R
2
 = 0.96; DW = 1.62; ADF =-4.7638 (CV= -
4.5276); AR1-2(2) =2.02 [0.363]; RESET-
F(1, 23) = 0.03[0.866]; NOR- 2(2) = 
4.5466[0.103]; H-F(1, 26) = 4.27[0.049] 
Y 1.1334** 12.86 
G2 -0.26** -4.42 
‘r’ -0.002** -2.86 
9b. C = f(Y, G2, r) without intercept
17
 
Y 1.223** 38.87 R
2
 = 0.96; DW = 1.51; ADF =-4.5417 (CV= -
4.17); AR1-2(2) =1.94 [0.379]; RESET-F(1, 
24) = 1.189[0.286]; NOR- 2(2) = 
1.5589[0.459]; H-F(1, 26) = 4.5879[0.042];  
G2 -0.310** -7.76 
‘r’ -0.002* -2.63 
13b. TD = f(INPT, d) 
INPT 3.86** 2.93 R
2
 = 0.11; DW = 1.82; ADF =-5.0352(CV= -
3.5804); AR1-2(2) =0.73 [0.694]; RESET-
F(1, 24) = 0.22[0.64]; NOR- 2(2) = 
7.33[0.06]; H-F(1, 25) = 1.39[0.25] 
d 0.38 1.74 
 
                                               
17
 Wald Statistic CHSQ( 1)= 11680.1[.000] for a1=|a2|; Wald Statistic CHSQ( 1)= 57.9031[.000] for a2=a3 
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Table 3: Error correction models 
 
Eq. No. and 
variables 
(1) 
Estimated 
coefficients 
(2) 
t-values 
 
(3) 
R
2
, DW, ADF and its critical value(CV) and 
other diagnostic tests 
(4) 
ECM 1. Error correction (EC) model of equation 1: C = f(INPT, Y, G, T, W); statistically 
insignificant intercept and T are excluded. 
Y 1.651** 5.88 R
2
 = 0.85; DW = 1.52; AR1-F(1, 22)= 
7.49[0.012]; RESET-F(1, 22) = 
1.1982[0.286]; NOR- 2(2) = 1.0270[0.598]; 
H-F(1, 25) = 0.001[0.974] 
G -0.343** -6.08 
W -0.175* -2.37 
Ut-1 -0.650** -3.25 
ECM 4. EC model of equation 4: C = f(INPT, Y, T, d); statistically insignificant intercept 
is excluded. 
Y 1.150** 4.93 R
2
 = 0.79; DW = 1.73; AR1-F(1, 22)= 
1.78[0.196]; RESET-F(1, 22) = 0.114[0.739]; 
NOR- 2(2) = 1.33[0.513]; H-F(1, 25) = 
0.181[0.674] 
T -0.223** -5.49 
d -0.170** -6.55 
Ut-1 -0.907** -4.81 
ECM 6. EC model of equation 6: C = f(INPT, Y, T, G2); statistically insignificant 
intercept and T are excluded. 
Y 1.24** 5.95 R
2
 = 0.83; DW = 1.84; AR1-F(1, 22)= 
0.38[0.542]; RESET-F(1, 23) = 0.15[0.702]; 
NOR- 2(2) = 2.74[0.254]; H-F(1, 25) = 
0.17[0.683] 
G2 -0.434** -9.03 
Ut-1 -0.881** -4.8 
ECM 7. EC model of equation 7: C = f(INPT, (Y-G2), d); statistically insignificant 
intercept and b are excluded. 
Y 0.653* 2.18 R
2
 = 0.57; DW = 1.78; AR1-F(1, )= 
0.02[0.889]; RESET-F(1, 23) = 3.37[0.079]; 
NOR- 2(2) = 0.355[0.837]; H-F(1, 25) = 
2.24[0.084] 
(Y-G2) -0.165** -4.89 
Ut-1 -0.760** -3.985 
ECM 8. EC model of equation 8: C = f(INPT, Y, G2, RB); statistically insignificant 
intercept and RB are excluded. 
Y 1.225** 5.61 R
2
 = 0.81; DW = 1.85; AR1-F(1, 23)= 
0.167[0.686]; RESET-F(1, 23) = 
0.202[0.657]; NOR-2(2) = 4.1857 [0.123]; 
H-F(1, 25) = 0.17[0.689] 
G2 -0.448 -8.96 
Ut-1 -0.829** -4.35 
ECM9b. EC model of equation 9b: C = f(INPT, Y, G2, r) 
INPT 0.01 1.01 R
2
 = 0.89; DW = 1.78; AR1-F(1, 21)= 
1.48[0.237]; RESET-F(1, 21) = 0.265[0.612]; 
NOR- 2(2) = 0.248[0.883]; H-F(1, 25) = 
0.418[0.524] 
Y 1.04** 4.83 
G2 -0.366** -6.81 
r -0.001 -1.40 
Ut-1 -1.05** -5.52 
ECM 13b. EC model of 13b: TD = f(INPT, b) 
INPT 0.02 0.39 R
2
 = .48; DW = 2.28; AR1-F(1, 22) = 14.87 
[.001]; RESET-F(1, 22) =.006[.939];  NOR- 
2(2) = 6.886[.032]; H-F(1, 24) = 
0.21410[.648] 
d 0.157 0.73 
Ut-1 -0.93** -4.6388 
Ut-1 is the EC term, i.e. the lag value of residual of the corresponding equation. 
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Table 4: Estimates of Aschauer model
18
: 
  
Constrained Unconstrained Hypothesised 
 = -0.29 (-0.67)   = -0.29 (-0.00)  = -0.4385 
b = 1.03** (27.30) b  = 1.03 (0.04) b = 1.03 
 = 0.47* (4.06) 1 = 0.47 (0.03)  1 = -0.0235 
 1 = 0.42 (0.03) 1 = 0.1645 
  = 1.55** (3.24)   = 1.55 (1.38)  (C1) = 1.55   
1 = 1.08* (6.27) 1 = 1.08 (1.90) 1(C2) = 1.08  
1  = -0.35 (-1.66) 1 = -0.35 (-1.35) 1 (C4) = -0.35  
Log likelihood (Lr) = 78.95819 Log likelihood(Lu) = -61.42386  
The Wald statistics = -2log(Lr/Lu) = - not significant  
 
 
                                               
18
  We use Eviews to estimate this non-linear model. The full information maximum likelihood and three-stage least squares 
methods are used to estimate both restricted and unrestricted models. Results obtained from the full information maximum 
likelihood methods are reported here. Both methods give somewhat unstable results. The full information maximum likelihood 
method in some cases gives unexpected positive values of log likelihood. Thus, further investigation will be made using other 
software packages in order derive stable results.  
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 Table 5: Sources of the deviation of REH 
 
Eq. No. and 
variables 
(1) 
Estimated 
coefficients 
(2) 
t-values 
 
(3) 
R
2
, DW and null hypotheses 
(4) 
Evans (1988) Model) (eq. 11c): non-linear estimation (with r=4) 
 0.81** 190.49 R
2
 = 0.82; DW = 2.03; Wald Statistic 2(1) = 
2085.931 [0.000] for   =1.  0.01 -1.69 
Haque (1988) Model (eq. 11d): non-linear estimation (with r=4) 
 0.70** 5.67 R
2
 = -4.75; DW = 2.01; Wald Statistic 2(1) =  
5.657[0.017] for   =1.  -0.47 -0.77 
Hayashi (1982) Model) (eq. 11e): non-linear estimation (with r=4) 
 0.80** 344.35 R
2
 = 0.77; DW = 1.91; Wald Statistic 2(1) =  
7527.538[0.000] for   =1.  0.000 0.42 
Himarios (1994) Model (eq. 11c’) non-linear estimation  
 0.98** 159.54 R
2
 = 0.86; DW = 1.18; Wald Statistic 2(1) =  
14.88[0.000] for   =1. Wald Statistic 2(1) =  
10156.45[0.000] for   ==0. 
 -0.01 -1.40 
 0.89 25.52 
Himarios (1994) Model (eq. 11d’) non-linear estimation  
 1.18** 346.11 R
2
 = 0.29; DW = 1.51; Wald Statistic 2(1) =  
2704.80 [0.000] for   =1. Wald Statistic 
2(1) =  432.7557 [0.000] for   ==0. 
 -2.67** -6.82 
 3.31** 6.94 
Himarios (1994) Model) (eq. 11e’) non-linear estimation  
 0.79** 122.41 R
2
 = 80; DW = 1.84; Wald Statistic 2(1) =  
1096.407 [0.000] for   =1. Wald Statistic 
2(1) =  3.70[0.157] for   ==0. 
 0.002 1.70 
 -0.07 -1.91 
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Table 6: Sources of the deviation of REH 
 
Eq. No. and 
variables 
(1) 
Estimated 
coefficients 
(2) 
t-values 
 
(3) 
R
2
, DW, ADF and its critical value(CV) and 
other diagnostic tests 
(4) 
Evans (1988) Model) (eq. 11c) with AR(2) 
Ct-1 0.976** 118.34 R
2
 = 0.91;   DW = 2.02; 2(1) = 9.7601[.002] 
(to test the coefficient of  At-1 equal to zero.  
2(1) = 8.63(00.003) (to test the coefficient of 
Ct-1 equal to one). 
At-1 0.030** 3.12 
AR(1) -0.047 -0.53 
AR(2) -0.891** -10.23 
Haque (1988), Equation 11d 
Ct-1 0.50* 2.67 R
2
 = 0.86; DW = 1.79; AR1-F(1, 23)= 
13.95[0.001]; RESET-F(1, 23) = 3.58[0.071]; 
NOR- 2(2) = 31.2455[0.000]; H-F(1, 25) = 
3.02[0.095] 
Ct-2 -0.02 -0.14 
Yt-1  0.51** 4.01 
Haque (1988) model when lagged disposable income is included 
Ct-1 0.374* 2.04 R
2
 = 0.88; DW = 1.69; AR1-F(1, 23)= 
4.08[0.055]; RESET-F(1, 23) = 2.85[0.105]; 
NOR- 2(2) = 45.48[0.000]; H-F(1, 25) = 
2.36[0.137] 
Ct-2 -0.053 -0.36 
(Yt-1 - Tt-1) 0.672** 4.81 
Hayashi (1982) model eq. 11e 
Ct-1 0.216* 2.07 Linear estimation Sample 1975-1997; R
2
 = 
0.93; DW = 2.04 ; 2(2) = 58.93(0.000) (to 
test the coefficient of Wt-2 and Yt-1 equal to 
zero. 
At-2 -0.049** 5.03 
Yt-1  0.810** 7.63 
Khalid (1996), equation 12c 
INPT 1.56 2.00 R
2
 = 0.89; DW = 1.71; AR1-F(1, 20)= 
1.53[0.230]; RESET-F(1, 20) = 0.02[0.898]; 
NOR- 2(2) = 25.9077[0.000]; H-F(1, 25) = 
2.1432[0.156]; Wald Statistic 2(1) =  
8.5888[.003] for  the csoefficient of Ct-1. 
Ct-1 0.01 0.03 
Yt-1 1.52* 2.41 
Yt-2  -0.63 -1.06 
Gt-1 -0.26 -1.55 
Gt-2 0.13 1.39 
 
 
